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Evidence to the Finance and Constitution Committee 
Trade Bill 
Dr Billy A. Melo Araujo - Queen’s University Belfast1 
 
This submission is in response to a call for evidence to inform the Finance and Constitution 
Committee’s scrutiny of the Trade Bill and the associated Legislative Consent Motion. 
 
1. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT 
 
1.1 Scope 
The Trade Bill provides the executive the power to implement obligations derived from the 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).  
The WTO Government Procurement Agreement includes two broad categories of rules. 
Firstly, there are national treatment obligations that require GPA members not to 
discriminate against procurement suppliers of other parties. Non-discrimination obligations 
included in the GPA are typically subject to a number of limitations based on three 
parameters: entities covered; value thresholds; and coverage in regards of goods, services 
and construction services2. With respect to the type of entities covered by the GPA, 
countries are entitled to choose the extent to which their market access commitments apply 
to procurement from central government entities, sub-central governmental entities and 
other governmental entities3. Federal countries such as Canada and the US have thus been 
able to exclude provincial/state and local government procurements from non-discrimination 
requirements under the GPA. GPA members can also set the minimum value of public 
procurement contracts above which the non-discrimination obligation applies  
The second broad category of obligations are the so-called ‘framework rules’ – that is, 
minimum rules that together establish an overall regulatory framework that aims to ensure 
open, transparent and competitive public procurement procedural frameworks. Such 
procedural rules usually relate to transparency requirements, eligibility of tenderers, contract 
award procedures and judicial and administrative enforcement. 
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Currently the UK benefits from the GPA in its capacity as an EU Member State. Whether the 
UK would remain a party of the GPA once it formally leaves the EU is a question that is the 
subject of some debate. However, the Trade Bill Explanatory Notes4 published by the UK 
Department of International Trade accepts that the UK will leave the GPA once it formally 
withdraws from the EU and will need to accede as a new party in its own right. Although the 
EU’s exclusive competence in the area means that the UK is in principle precluded from 
negotiating trade agreements, it is understood that the UK is, in cooperation with the EU, 
currently engaged in discussions relating to the terms of its accession to the GPA. On 3 
October 2017, a Joint EU-UK Letter to the WTO membership was published confirming that 
the EU and the UK would work together on the UK’s objective of remaining within the GPA 
upon leaving the EU, on the basis of the commitments currently contained in the EU 
schedule of commitments. 
 
1.2 Potential amendments to terms of UK GPA membership 
With respect to national treatment commitments, it is expected that the UK’s new proposed 
GPA coverage will be at the very least in line with the existing EU GPA commitments. Any 
proposal to reduce access to the UK procurement market would be unlikely to be looked 
upon favourably by GPA membership, not least because the UK represents a smaller market 
than that on the basis of which the EU GPA coverage was negotiated. The Explanatory 
Notes state that the changes to UK regulations as a result of the accession to the GPA 
would include those relating to the creation of new Government Departments as a result of 
the UK’s exit from the EU, which are currently not mentioned in the EU GPA schedules. 
However, the possibility that GPA parties may demand a renegotiation of terms of the UK’s 
accession and demand additional market access commitments from the UK should not be 
dismissed.  
These framework rules only establish minimum standards. Since the EU procurement rules 
are accepted to be GPA-compliant, accession to the GPA should not require any substantive 
amendments in UK procurement rules as they currently stand.  
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2. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
2.1 Scope 
The Trade Bill provides the executive the power to implement obligations derived from 
international trade agreements. There is a significant deal of uncertainty concerning what is 
encompassed by the term “international trade agreements”.  
Clause 2(3)(a) of the Bill describes an international trade agreement as (a) a free trade 
agreement, or (b) an international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a trade 
agreement. The Trade Bill defines free trade agreements as agreements notifiable under 
Article XXIV GATT(7)(a). This includes customs union and free trade agreements. 
A customs union is defined by Article XXIV(8)(a) GATT as the substitution of a single 
customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce […] are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the 
trade in products originating in such territories, and, (ii) substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade 
of territories not included in the union”. This would include customs union agreements with 
Turkey, Andorra and San Marino. 
A free trade area is defined under Article XXIV(8)(b) GATT as an agreement whereby “a 
group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations 
of commerce […] are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territories”). The Explanatory Notes to the Trade Bill 
list by way of example free trade agreements signed by the EU countries, such as those with 
Switzerland, Canada and South Korea. It would also include agreements such as the 
European Economic Area (EEA) agreement and the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement. 
The Trade Bill provides that the UK intends to implement international trade agreements only 
to the extent that the European Union was a signatory to the agreement immediately before 
exit day. This means that the Trade Bill empowers the executive to implement international 
trade agreements that have not yet been ratified by the EU on the day the UK formally 
withdraws from the EU. Free trade agreements that have been signed but are currently in 
the process of being ratified include the EU-Singapore FTA and the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA).  
4 
 
Conferring power to implement obligations derived from international trade agreements that 
have merely been signed by the EU, rather than ratified, raises questions about the 
democratic legitimacy of the process. International trade agreements that are not yet ratified 
will not have gone through the entire parliamentary scrutiny process either at EU or national 
level. This is certainly the case of agreements such as the CETA which is a mixed 
agreement and will therefore have to be ratified by both the European Parliament and the 
national parliaments. In order to ensure that parliamentary scrutiny is not bypassed, the 
Trade Bill could be amended to provide that only those agreements that have been ratified 
by the prior to the UK’s withdrawal of the EU are covered by the bill.   
The Trade Bill does not provide much guidance with respect to the term ‘international trade 
agreements that mainly relate to trade’. The Explanatory Note states that these include “key 
trade agreements, and associated ancillary agreements” such as mutual recognition 
agreements. Although not specifically mentioned in the Trade Bill, one would assume that 
the concept of international trade agreements would also encompass customs cooperation 
or facilitation agreements concluded by the EU. It has also concluded international 
agreements with countries such Australia and the United States that protect names of origin 
(geographical indications) for agricultural products and foodstuffs, notably wine and spirits. 
There are number of areas that are increasingly covered by free trade agreements but which 
are arguably not mainly related to trade liberalisation. Contemporary EU free trade 
agreements contain provisions addressing issues such as competition law,and labour and 
environmental protection. This raises the question of whether stand-alone agreements 
focusing on such issues could also be considered as “international trade agreements” for the 
purpose of the Trade Bill. For example, the EU currently has in place agreements 
concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities with countries such as Japan and the 
United States. As stated above, it has also concluded stand-alone agreements relating to the 
protection of geographical indications. Similar questions can be raised with respect to 
international treaties signed by the EU in areas such as aviation and environmental 
protection. 
Therefore, as currently drafted, the Trade Bill is very broad in its scope. The vagueness of 
the term “international trade agreements” provides a significant amount of discretion to the 
government to decide which type of agreements negotiated by the EU could fall under the 
scope of the Trade Bill.  In light of the significant powers that are being conferred to the 
executive to implement international trade agreements under the Trade Bill, as well as the 
light-touch level of parliamentary scrutiny currently envisaged (see Section 3), it may be 
worth considering amending the Trade Bill to provide further clarity in terms of the type of 
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international agreements concluded by the EU that would fall within the scope of the bill. 
This could be achieved, for example, by including in the Trade Bill an exhaustive list of the 
international trade agreements that fall within the scope of the bill.  
 
2.2 Potential amendments to ‘rolled-over’ international trade agreements 
The Explanatory Notes explain that the executive power provided under the bill to implement 
international trade agreements will be limited to non-tariff measures. Tariff measures are 
addressed under the Taxation (Cross-Border Trade) Bill. The Explanatory Notes also state 
that the “aim is to establish a UK trade agreement with each partner country based, as 
closely as possible, on the corresponding trade agreement that country has with the EU”5. 
 
However, the EU FTAs cannot simply be copy pasted in their current state or with only minor 
changes. This is acknowledged in the Explanatory Notes, which state that it “may also be 
necessary to substantively amend the text of the previous EU agreements, so that the new 
agreements can work in a UK legal context”. In fact, the UK international trade agreements 
will be entirely separate legal instruments and are likely to be substantially different from the 
EU FTAs for both political and technical reasons.  
 
Firstly, third countries are likely to see the transitioning of FTAs as an opportunity to revise 
the terms of these agreements. Some may also consider that to the extent that the UK is 
now offering a much smaller market than the EU single market, the terms of trade have 
changed, meaning that the marker access commitments included in these FTAs must also 
be renegotiated. In this respect, it is worth nothing that there are recent reports that countries 
such as Chile and South Korea have already signalled that post-Brexit, the status quo will 
not be maintained and that key aspects of existing EU trade agreements, such as 
agriculture, will have to be renegotiated with the UK6.  
 
Secondly, from a technical perspective, the idea that UK will be able to simply copy-paste 
existing EU FTAs does not take into account the fact that the rules of origin will have to be 
amended. As explained by the UK Trade Policy Observatory, the renegotiation of rules of 
origin included in trade agreements will be a tri-lateral process involving the UK, the third 
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countries and the EU7. Finally, some text included in current EU FTAs would no longer make 
sense in the context of a UK-only trade agreement. For example, all recent EU FTAs tend to 
include schedules listing EU and third country geographical indications that must be 
protected by both parties. References to geographical indications from other EU Member 
States will have to be removed.  
 
 
3. THE POWER TO IMPLEMENT THE GPA AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
The implementation of international trade agreements will be achieved through Henry VIII 
clauses. This executive power to implement international trade agreement is laid down in 
sections 1(1) and 2(1) of the bill which provide that an appropriate authority may by 
regulations make such provision as the authority considers appropriate for the purpose of 
implementing the GPA or international trade an agreement which the United Kingdom is a 
signatory. 
The regulations will be subject to the negative scrutiny procedure meaning that the 
delegated legislation remains law unless a House votes to annul it within a limited time 
period.  
Parliamentary scrutiny on the implementation of international trade agreements will therefore 
be limited under the current Trade Bill. This is problematic because, as discussed, (i) the 
term ‘international trade agreement’ used by the Trade Bill is vague and potentially very wide 
in its scope: (ii) the Trade Bill covers EU free trade agreements that have merely signed, 
rather than only those that have been ratified under EU law; and (iii) the UK government has 
acknowledged the implementing power conferred by the Trade Bill “is broad enough to allow 
implementation of substantial amendments, including new obligations”8. 
 
4. RESTRICTIONS ON DEVOLVED AUTHORITIES AND THE SEWEL CONVENTION 
In accordance with the Sewel Convention, the Scottish Parliament must give its consent 
where the UK Parliament intends to legislate a matter that is normally legislated by the 
Scottish Parliament. It is outlined under the Devolution Guidance note 10 that any proposals 
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in UK Parliament legislation which alter the legislative competence of the Parliament or the 
executive competence of the Scottish Ministers require the consent of the Parliament. The 
convention is further restated under section 28 of the Scotland act which recognises “that the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters 
without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.  
 
It can be argued that, together, the EU Withdrawal Bill and the Trade Bill both alter the 
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and legislate in areas of devolved 
competence.  
 
Clause 11(1) of the Withdrawal Bill maintains the current prohibition on the Scottish 
Parliament to legislate in a manner that is incompatible with “retained EU law”. More 
specifically, it restricts the ability to amend retained EU law in a way that would have been 
incompatible with EU law before the UK’s withdrawal.  
 
This restriction also affects the interaction between devolved authorities and future UK trade 
policy. One of the advantages of leaving the EU is that devolved authorities could in theory 
be able to regulate matters falling within their competence in a manner that better reflects 
their interests and preferences. For example, with respect to procurement, should the UK 
leave the EU without a deal or even with a CETA-style agreement, this would significantly 
expand the regulatory flexibility available to the UK and allow it to address some of the flaws 
typically associated with the EU procurement regulatory system9. To the extent that the GPA 
rules are far less detailed and restrictive than EU rules, devolved authorities such as 
Scotland would, in theory, have a greater degree of regulatory autonomy in setting 
procurement rules once the UK leaves the EU. 
 
However, as the Withdrawal Bill restricts the ability of devolved territories from amending 
retained EU law, the devolved administrations may be precluded from adopting a 
procurement system which better reflects their own regulatory preferences. 
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This approach is replicated in the Trade Bill. Paragraph 2(1) of the Schedule 1 to the Trade 
Bill provides that devolved authorities may not make regulations implementing the GPA or 
international trade agreements which modify any retained EU law or anything which is 
retained by virtue of section 4 of the Withdrawal Bill. A similar restriction is not imposed on 
UK ministers in order to ensure that the UK-wide regulatory framework provided by EU-
retained law is maintained. However, this means that the powers of UK ministers will be 
increased in areas of devolved competence which would arguably alter the constitutional 
balance between Westminster and Scotland. 
 
 
5. PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY 
As a preliminary point, it is important to highlight that the Trade Bill is silent on the 
negotiation phase of international trade agreements, as it focuses only on the 
implementation phase. More specifically, the bill makes no mention of any parliamentary 
procedure which would lead up to the negotiation and ratification of trade agreements. Most 
countries have in a place, at a very basic level, a trade negotiating authority mechanism 
where Parliament can give the authority to the executive branch to negotiate trade 
agreements and ratify such trade agreements once negotiations are concluded.  
The Explanatory Notes explain that Parliamentary approval for ratifying both the UK’s 
membership of the GPA and the international trade agreements covered by the Trade Bill 
will be sought via the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRGA). Under the 
CRGA, the Parliament has a de facto power to block the ratification of international treaties. 
The government must submit international treaties before both Houses for 21 sitting days 
and if the House of Commons resolves that the treaty is not ratified, a further 21 sitting-day 
period is triggered. If parliament maintains its refusal to ratify the agreement, the process is 
repeated indefinitely.   
In the context of the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements, this system is not fit-
for-purpose. A more substantial involvement of parliament in the decision making process 
involving the negotiation of trade agreements is required. As stated above, at a basic level, 
most countries will grant parliament the power to either approve or reject the international 
agreement as a whole.  
 
Many jurisdictions have gone further by allowing for substantial parliamentary engagement 
prior and during the negotiating process. For example, in the EU, trade negotiations may 
only be initiated once the Council of Ministers has approved a negotiating mandate for the 
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Commission. The draft negotiating directive must be made available to the European 
Parliament prior to the granting of the authorisation. While the European Parliament has no 
formal role in the authorization of the negotiations, it does have extensive rights to be kept 
informed during the entire procedure. The European Commission must report to the 
European Parliament on the progress of negotiations after each negotiating round. The 
European Parliament can adopt resolutions that signal conditions under which it is willing to 
approve the agreement at the end of the process. When the Commission submits the 
finalised version of the negotiated agreement for approval, the European parliament cannot 
make any amendments but votes to either approve or reject the entire agreement. 
In the US, the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements occurs in accordance with the 
Trade Promotion Authority. TPA is the authority Congress grants to the President to enter 
into certain trade agreements, and to have their implementing bills considered under 
expedited legislative procedures, provided the president observes certain statutory 
obligations. The fast track approach does not mean that the US Congress has no role to play 
in the decision making process. Before the negotiations begin, the executive must notify 
Congress of its intention to enter into trade negotiations and consult with the House Ways 
and Means, Senate Finance and other relevant committees. Likewise, once negotiations 
have been completed, the executive must notify Congress of its intention to enter into the 
agreement and consult relevant congress committees on issues relating to the nature of the 
agreement, how it achieves the purposes defined in TPA, and any potential effects it may 
have on existing laws. Finally, agreements concluded under the TPA can either be approved 
or not. 
In addition to formal procedures allowing for parliamentary scrutiny, there are also other 
tools that should be put in place in order to enhance the democratic legitimacy of trade 
negotiations. Firstly, some consideration should be given to the creation of mechanisms and 
obligations that enhance the transparency of trade negotiations. The European Commission, 
for example, publishes the draft negotiating directive, a report of each negotiating round and 
its initial negotiating proposals and organises regular meetings with civil society actors.  
There are additional measures that have been put in place to enhance the quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny of the negotiation and conclusion of EU FTAs. Firstly, the European 
Commission must carry out a scoping exercise where it will hold preliminary discussions with 
third parties to determine whether a free trade agreement with a particular third country is 
feasible or indeed desirable. Secondly, the Commission will order an impact assessment. 
This will include a public consultation with stakeholders and interested parties. It also carries 
out sustainability impact assessment which looks at the likely economic, social and 
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environmental effects of a trade agreement.  The Commission also regularly carries out ex-
post evaluations to assess the effects of FTAs.  
In this respect, it should be noted that, on 17 January 2018, an amendment to the Trade Bill 
has been tabled proposing that negotiations on international trade agreements cannot begin 
until a public consultation and a geographic impact assessment examining the effect of the 
agreement on the devolved territories are carried out10. Such an amendment would be to 
enhance the democratic legitimacy and the quality of parliamentary scrutiny on such 
agreements.  
The lack of parliamentary scrutiny envisaged by the Trade Bill in the process of transitioning 
EU third country free trade agreements is reflective of the need for urgency in transitioning 
current EU FTAs once the UK leaves the EU, and the fact that most of these agreements 
have already been through the comprehensive parliamentary scrutiny process carried out at 
EU and (for EU mixed agreements) national level. However, the small role attributed by the 
bill to parliament and devolved authorities seems ill-placed given that some of the 
agreements may require substantive modifications whilst some have not gone through the 
entire EU parliamentary scrutiny process. It is also important to ensure that the decision 
making process concerning the negotiation of “rolled-over” trade agreements covered by the 
Trade Bill are not used as a template for the negotiation of future international trade 
agreements. 
 
6. ROLE OF DEVOLVED ADMINISTRATIONS IN NEGOTIATING TRADE AGREEMENTS 
The Trade Bill does not foresee any role for devolved administrations in the decision-making 
processes surrounding the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements. This is 
problematic, since many issues covered in contemporary EU trade agreements are also 
devolved matters (e.g., agriculture and procurement).  
There are a number of examples in federal countries of systems of inter-governmental 
relations that allow for cooperation between central and sub-national governments in the 
development of trade policy.  Canada, in particular, has institutionalised cooperative 
mechanisms that allow for the consultation and sometimes even the involvement of 
provinces in trade negotiations. Consultations occur in the framework of the Federal-
Provincial committee on Trade (C-Trade), a body composed of trade representatives from 
both the federal government and provincial executives. It meets on a quarterly basis to 
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discuss a wide variety of trade policy issues from broad discussions on the general 
orientation of the Canadian international trade policy framework and Canada’s position in 
relation to the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral trade agreements, to discussions on 
specific trade topics of relevance to the provinces. Beyond these meetings, the federal 
government also makes draft negotiating documents available to province representatives, 
who are invited to submit their observations and put forward their agendas. The C-Trade 
meetings therefore provide a platform for ongoing information exchange on the development 
of trade negotiations and a venue through which provinces can influence the negotiating 
positions of the federal government. In doing so, the discussions enhance the legitimacy of 
the negotiated agreements in the eyes of the provincial executives.  
The C-Trade cooperation framework is also complemented by a number of consultative 
committees that focus on sector specific issues. For example, agriculture is not an issue that 
is typically addressed in the context of C-Trade but rather in a specifically designated 
federal-provincial committee. In addition to these consultative mechanisms, the provinces 
maintain regular dialogue with the federal government on trade policy matters. Cooperation 
occurs through informal communication channels of communication between trade officials 
on both sides. However, informal cooperation remains limited to minor administrative and 
technical issues, rather than the more important policy issues.  
Finally, there are recent examples of occasions where the role of provinces in trade 
negotiations was elevated to that of an active participant in trade negotiations. During the 
negotiations of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement, the EU, which 
was hoping to gain access to the provincial procurement markets in Canada, requested that 
provinces be involved in the negotiation process. Another recent example can be found in 
the context of the negotiation on the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) where, at the request of 
the United States, provinces were not allowed to present sit at the negotiating table but were 
briefed after all negotiating meetings and given the opportunity to voice their concerns and 
advise on matters that fell within their competence. 
The UK currently has in place a series of agreements which provide guidelines and 
mechanisms to ensure cooperation and coordination in policy making in matters that fall 
within the sphere of competence of the devolved administrations. The UK system has, 
however, failed to provide an effective framework for inter-governmental cooperation in 
areas of foreign policy that overlap with devolved matters. In 2015, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution issued a report on inter-governmental relations in the 
United Kingdom which found that, with the exception of the European Affairs sub-committee, 
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the Joint Ministerial Committee had proved highly ineffective in fostering cooperation 
between the UK government and devolved administrations.  
The UK’s system of inter-governmental cooperation, as it currently stands, would not provide 
devolved administrations the type of influence on trade policy and trade negotiations that is 
bestowed on Canadian provinces. To redress that balance, the UK should consider the 
establishment of a formal and institutionalised system of cooperation based on regular 
consultations. The formal cooperation mechanism can adapt the template set by Canadian 
inter-governmentalism and create a Joint Committee on Trade (JCT) focused exclusively on 
trade. The JCT would be composed of relevant ministerial representatives of the central 
government and devolved administrations and meet four times per year to discuss major 
issues relating to trade agreements, such as the setting of negotiation objectives and 
common positions, and the identification of areas where trade agreements should reflect the 
specific circumstances of devolved territories. Inter-governmental cooperation in this area 
should be made legally binding to ensure that cooperation occurs on a continuous basis 
rather than on an ad hoc basis. The additional security resulting from the requirement to hold 
regular meetings would encourage the devolved administrations to assume responsibility in 
trade matters, and to make the necessary investment to develop capacity and expertise in 
trade matters. The regular dialogue would also build trust between the parties, which is more 
likely to lead to constructive cooperation. 
The formal institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation should also reflect the complex 
nature of contemporary trade agreements. The complexity relates to the subject matters 
regulated in trade agreements as well as the processes involved in negotiating, concluding 
and implementing them. Cooperation should encompass all areas covered in trade 
negotiations that overlap with devolved matters. The JCT should be granted the power to 
establish working committees focused on key areas of strategic interests for devolved 
administrations. These sub-committees would be composed of civil service staff with 
expertise on specific trade issues from both central government and devolved 
administrations, and would be used to carry out more technical discussions.  
Consideration must also be given to the right of devolved administrations to participate in 
trade negotiations. The Canadian experience shows that the inclusion of sub-national 
representations in international negotiations need not undermine the cohesion of a country’s 
negotiating position. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the involvement of 
representatives of devolved administrations would add a layer of legitimacy to the 
negotiation process and improve the chances of successful outcome. Devolved 
administrations are more experienced and attuned to the complexities of matters that fall 
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wholly within devolved competence and would be better placed to put forward solutions and 
break deadlocks that may arise in relation to such matters. In short, allowing for such 
representation would reflect the fact that devolved territories are also responsible for matters 
addressed in trade agreements, further reinforcing buy-in for such agreements at devolved 
levels. 
An amendment to the Trade Bill was tabled on 23 January 201711, to create a clause that 
would establish a Joint Ministerial Committee as a forum where devolved administrations 
could be consulted on (i) the terms upon which the United Kingdom is to commence 
negotiations with respect to any international trade agreement; and (ii) proposals to amend 
retained EU law for the purposes of the implementation of international trade agreements. 
The amendment would be welcome as it creates a legally binding obligation on the UK 
government to consult with devolved territories for each individual trade agreement. It could, 
however, go further by establishing a legal obligation to hold a specified number of meetings 
on an annual basis that would allow devolved authorities to follow up on the progress of 
negotiations and shape such negotiations progressively. 
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